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CLEANING UP OUR TOXIC COASTS: 
A PRECAUTIONARY AND HUMAN HEALTH-BASED APPROACH TO COASTAL 
ADAPTATION 
 
Robin Kundis Craig* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Hurricanes in the United States in 2005, 2012, and 2017 have all 
revealed an insidious problem for coastal climate change adaptation: toxic 
contamination in the coastal zone. As sea levels rise and violent coastal 
storms become increasingly frequent, this legacy of toxic pollution 
threatens immediate emergency response, longer term human health, and 
coastal ecosystems’ capacity to adapt to changing coastal conditions. 
 
 Focusing on Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 devastation of Houston, 
Texas, as its primary example, this Article first discusses the toxic legacy 
still present in many coastal environments. It then examines the existing 
laws available to clean up the coastal zone—CERCLA, RCRA, and the 
Coastal Zone Management Act at the federal level, land use planning, and 
state tort law—both to identify ways in which states and the federal 
government could more effectively implement existing law and to suggest 
improvements to these existing laws to more emphatically prioritize the 
elimination of toxic coastal legacies. It concludes with three specific 
recommendations that precautionarily prioritize human health 
considerations in coastal management as a means of reducing coastal 
toxicity in the Anthropocene. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 When Hurricane Harvey, a Category 4 hurricane, made landfall on the central 
Texas coast just north of Corpus Christi on August 25, 2017,1 it demonstrated both the 
power and the danger of coastal storms in ways that should be relevant for U.S. coastal 
policy throughout the 21st century. First, Harvey was huge and repeatedly battered the 
Gulf coast. At its first landfall, the hurricane was 280 miles in diameter and had 130 mile-
per-hour winds.2 It moved north to Houston the next day and remained there for four 
days, then made landfall a third time on August 29 at Port Arthur and Beaumont, Texas, 
near the Louisiana border.3 While Hurricane Harvey concentrated its force on Texas and 
Louisiana, “[i]t affected 13 million people from Texas through Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Kentucky.”4 At least 88 people died as a result of the storm,5 and 
thousands more were left homeless.6  
 
 Second, Hurricane Harvey brought record-breaking rainfall—and subsequent 
unprecedented flooding—to the Gulf Coast.7 As noted, the hurricane stalled out over 
Houston, dropping two feet of rain in the first 24 hours and 40 inches over 48 hours.8 
																																																						
1 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018). 
2 CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,” 
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018); Kimberly 
Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018). 
3 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 For a more comprehensive discussion of Hurricane Harvey’s flooding and its potential 
implications for reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance Program, see Robin 
Kundis Craig, Harvey, Irma, and the NFIP: Did the 2017 Hurricane Season Matter to 
Flood Insurance Reauthorization?, 40:3 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. XXX, XXX 
(forthcoming 2018). 
8 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018). “In comparison Hurricane Katrina dropped just 5 to 10 inches of rain in 48 hours. 
Most of its flooding came from storm surges that overwhelmed the levee system.” Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224768 
Craig OUR TOXIC COASTS  3 
Two reservoirs overflowed.9 When the hurricane made landfall for the third time, “[i]t 
dumped 26 inches of rain in 24 hours” at the Louisiana border,10 then rained an additional 
10 inches on Nashville, Tennessee, on September 1.11 In an attempt to describe the scale 
of the rainfall, a Washington Post reporter noted that “[a]t least 20 inches of rain fell over 
an area (nearly 29,000 square miles) larger than 10 states, including West Virginia and 
Maryland (by a factor of more than two)” and “[a]t least 30 inches of rain fell over an 
area (more than 11,000 square miles) equivalent to Maryland’s size.”12 At the storm’s 
peak on September 1, one-third of Houston was underwater,13 and “[t]otal rainfall hit 
51.88 inches in Cedar Bayou on the outskirts of Houston. That’s a record for a single 
storm in the continental United States.”14  
 
 Third, Harvey may be the first hurricane for which scientists agree that climate 
change made a significant contribution the storm’s severity.15 While scientists still will 
not assert that climate change “causes” any particular coastal storm, in December 2017, 
																																																						
9 Id. 
10 Id.; CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,” 
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018). 
11 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018). 
12 Jason Samenow, “Harvey is a 1000-year flood event unprecedented in scale,” The 
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-
gang/wp/2017/08/31/harvey-is-a-1000-year-flood-event-unprecedented-in-
scale/?utm_term=.a36393ce6b2f (Aug. 13, 2017). 
13 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018). 
14 Id.; CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,” 
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018). 
15 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018); Henry Fountain, “Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate 
Change,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/climate/hurricane-
harvey-climate-change.html?_r=0 (Dec. 13, 2017); Mark D. Risser & Michael F. 
Wehner, Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and Magnitude of the 
Observed Extreme Precipitation during Hurricane Harvey, 44:24 GEOPHYSICAL 
RESEARCH LETTERS 12,457, 12,457-64 (23 Dec. 2017); Geert Jan van Oldenborgh, Karin 
van der Wiel, Antonia Sebastian, Roop Singh, Julie Arrighi, Friederike Otto, Karsten 
Haustein, Sihan Li, Gabriel Vecchi, & Heidi Cullen, Attribution of extreme rainfall from 
Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12:12 ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LETTERS 124009, 
https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa9ef2 (13 Dec. 2017). 
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two research groups concluded that Harvey’s record rainfall “was as much as 38 percent 
higher than would be expected in a world that was not warming.”16 Warmer-than-normal 
air and ocean water temperatures, sea levels that are six inches higher than 20 years ago, 
and climate change-affected weather patterns that promote storm stalling may all have 
contributed to Harvey’s record-breaking precipitation.17 In addition, both studies “found 
that climate change roughly tripled the odds of a Harvey-type storm.”18 Thus, as climate 
scientists have long predicted,19 it appears that climate change is already increasing the 
likelihood of increasingly severe hurricanes. 
 
 Finally, and of particular relevance to this Article, Hurricane Harvey 
demonstrated in immediately comprehensible ways the latent toxicity of the United 
States’ coasts. For example, among other issues, “Harvey flooded 800 wastewater 
treatment facilities and 13 Superfund sites[,] spread[ing] sewage and toxic chemicals into 
the flooded areas.”20 As will be discussed in more detail in Part II, Harvey, and to a lesser 
extent Hurricane Irma, caused significant toxic pollutant loading in the communities they 
affected, particularly Houston. Given the prediction of increasing numbers of 
increasingly severe coastal storms throughout the 21st century,21 Harvey and Irma make 
compelling cases for a more precautionary and health-based approach to coastal 
management that prioritizes: (1) cleaning up current coastal contamination; (2) 
																																																						
16 Henry Fountain, “Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate 
Change,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/climate/hurricane-
harvey-climate-change.html?_r=0 (Dec. 13, 2017); Michael Greshko, “Climate Change 
Likely Supercharged Hurricane Harvey,” National Geographic, 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-study-hurricane-harvey-
flood/ (Dec. 13, 2017) (reporting the same 38 percent high). See also Risser & Wehner, 
supra note 15, at 12,462-63 (reporting 19 percent as most probable); Oldenborgh et al., 
supra note 15, at 1 (reporting 15 percent as most probable). 
17 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018); German Lopez, “How global warming likely made Harvey much worse, explained 
by a climatologist,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2017/8/28/16214268/houston-floods-harvey-global-warming (Aug. 28, 2017). 
18 Michael Greshko, “Climate Change Likely Supercharged Hurricane Harvey,” National 
Geographic, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-study-
hurricane-harvey-flood/ (Dec. 13, 2017); Oldenborgh et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
19 E.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SYNTHESIS Report 53 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT]. 
20 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 
2018). 
21 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19, at 53. 
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retrofitting existing coastal facilities that handle hazardous and toxic materials to prevent 
further coastal contamination; and (3) limiting the siting of addition such facilities in the 
coastal zone in the future. 
 
 This Article explores the toxic risks along the United States’ coasts, particularly 
in light of the increasing threat from coastal storms. It begins in Part II by providing an 
overview of existing contamination in the United States coastal zones, focusing on the 
damage that Hurricane Harvey caused in its interactions with Houston’s many hazardous 
waste sites and toxics-handling facilities. Part III then reviews existing legal authorities 
for dealing with coastal toxicity in both federal and state environmental and tort law. Part 
IV offers suggestions for a more precautionary and health-based approach to coastal 
toxicity, emphasizing both cleanup of existing problems and more toxicity-sensitive 
engagement in coastal land use planning and building codes. The Article concludes that 
there is much that federal, coastal state, and local governments could do to reduce toxicity 
exposure along the coasts during coastal storms, emphasizing that these measures also 
make considerable sense as a climate change adaptation strategy. 
 
 
II. THE UNITED STATES’ TOXIC COASTS 
 
A. An Overview of Coastal Toxicity in the United States 
 
 The United States is a coastal nation. As of 2010, over half of the U.S. population 
(excluding Alaska) lived in one of the nation’s 673 coastal counties.22 “Between 1960 
and 2008, the national coastline population rose by 84 percent, compared with 64 percent 
inland, according to the Census Bureau.”23 Moreover, coastal U.S. populations continue 
to grow at a faster pace than inland populations, despite significant hurricane seasons in 
2005 (Katrina), 2012 (Sandy), and 2017 (Harvey, Irma, and Maria).24 Thus, any risks to 
coastal populations pose a significant national problem. 
																																																						
22 National Ocean Service, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Coastal Hazards: 
Preparing for the Threats that Face Our Coastal Communities, 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/hazards/natural-hazards/ (as viewed July 30, 2018). See 
also Sarah G. McCarthy, John P. Incardona, & Nathaniel L. Scholtz, Coastal Storms, 
Toxic Runoff, and the Sustainable Conservation of Fish and Fisheries, 64 AMERICAN 
FISHERIES SOCIETY SYMPOSIUM 2 (Jan. 2008), available at 
https://www.coralreef.gov/transportation/stormsfish.pdf (noting that this land area 
represents only 17 percent of the United States). 
23 Jeff Donn, “U.S. coastal population continues to grow despite lessons of past storms,” 
The Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2017/09/16/us-coastal-population-
growth/ (Sept. 16, 2017). 
24 Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224768 
	 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW Aug. 1, 2018
  
6 
 
 The nation’s coasts receive toxic and hazardous pollution and exposure from a 
number of sources. For example, upstream agricultural and urban runoff carries 
pesticides, petroleum hydrocarbons, heavy metals, pathogens, and pharmaceuticals 
downstream to coastal communities and ecosystems;25 mercury has shown up in 
California coastal fog banks.26 In addition, between 1918 and 1970, the Department of 
Defense disposed of chemical weapons in the ocean, including sulphur mustard and 
chemical nerve agents, along all three U.S. coasts,27 although the Department concluded 
in a 2016 report to Congress that these wastes do not pose a significant threat to human 
health or the environment and that removal is not warranted.28 Facilities emitting air 
pollutants, including power plants and waste incinerators, can also be sources of coastal 
toxic exposure.29 
 
 The far more worrisome sources of coastal toxics with respect to hurricanes and 
sea-level rise, however, are land-based contaminated sites—landfills, illegal hazardous 
waste disposal sites, and legacy toxic waste dumps—and ongoing facilities that handle 
toxic and hazardous substances. At the federal level, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) tracks hazardous disposal sites through the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, often referred to 
as Superfund).30 Just a glance at the EPA’s map31 of sites listed on the National Priorities 
																																																						
25 Id. at 2. 
26 Alison Hawkes, “Toxic Fog? Mercury Showing Up in Coastal California Fog Banks,” 
KQED Science, https://www.kqed.org/science/419936/toxic-fog-mercury-showing-up-
in-coastal-california-fog-banks (Dec. 18, 2015). 
27 David M. Bearden, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Disposal of Chemical 
Weapons in the Ocean: Background and Issues for Congress 2 (as updated Jan. 3, 2007), 
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33432.pdf.  
28 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Research Related to Effect of Ocean Disposal of Munitions in 
U.S. Coastal Waters: A Report to Congress 2 (Nov. 2016), available at 
https://www.denix.osd.mil/derp/home/documents/sea-disposal-report-to-congress/.  
29 See, e.g., Toxics Action Center, Toxics in Massachusetts: A Town-by-Town Profile 12-
16 (April 2010), available at https://toxicsaction.org/wp-content/uploads/TAC-toxics-in-
massachusetts.pdf (discussing air pollution as a toxicity problem in Massachusetts and 
providing maps of power plants and waste incineration facilities that show where these 
sources are located along the coast).  
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012). 
31 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Superfund National Priorities List Map, 
https://epa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=33cebcdfdd1b4c3a8b51
d416956c41f1 (as viewed July 30, 2018). See also U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 
Cleanups in My Community Map, 
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/cimc/f?p=cimc:map:0:::71:P71_WELSEARCH:NULL%7
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List (NPL)32 indicates that many coastal cities contain significant concentrations of these 
highly toxic Superfund sites, especially Seattle, Washington; San Francisco, California; 
Los Angeles, California; Houston, Texas; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Pensacola, Florida; 
Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida; Jacksonville, Florida; Wilmington, North Carolina; and 
essentially the entire Atlantic coast from Norfolk, Virginia, north to Portland, Maine. 
 
 The EPA regulates ongoing industrial facilities that could pose hazardous or toxic 
waste problems through the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).33 
Releases at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities require 
corrective actions—that is, cleanups.34 While the EPA does not keep cleanup statistics in 
terms of inland versus coastal communities, its “Cleanups in My Community” map35 
indicates that RCRA corrective action sites are approximately as prevalent as NPL sites, 
roughly doubling the federally-actionable contaminated toxic sites along the U.S. coasts. 
 
 State-specific information can also help to flesh out the potential toxicity of the 
nation’s coasts. In Massachusetts, for example, RCRA large-quantity hazardous waste 
generators, CERCLA NPL sites, and state-designated Tier 1 hazardous waste sites are 
concentrated along the coast.36 Together with landfills, power plants, and incinerators, 
these sites produce a rather pronounced toxic load on the coast, especially around 
Boston.37 As the Toxics Action Center has summarized,  
 
Massachusetts has thousands of potential and identified hazardous waste 
sites awaiting cleanup, some of the worst air quality in the nation, and rivers 
and lakes polluted by industrial contaminants and toxic mercury. Asthma 
and cancer rates are some of the highest in the country, and both can be 
linked to environmental causes. Massachusetts is also plagued by economic 
																																																						
CCleanup%7C%7C%7C%7Cfalse%7Ctrue%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7C
%7C%7Csites%7CY (as viewed July 30, 2018). 
32 Id. § 9605(a); U.S. Envtl Protection Agency, Superfund: National Priorities List (NPL), 
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-national-priorities-list-npl (as viewed July 30, 
2018). 
33 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-69992k (2012). 
34 Id. at 6924(u), (v). 
35 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Cleanups in My Community Map, 
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/cimc/f?p=cimc:map:0:::71:P71_WELSEARCH:NULL%7
CCleanup%7C%7C%7C%7Cfalse%7Ctrue%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7Cfalse%7C
%7C%7Csites%7CY (as viewed July 30, 2018). 
36 See Toxics Action Center, supra note 29, at 11, 19, 21 (providing maps). 
37 See id. at 26 (showing the cumulative concentration of toxic facilities). 
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disparities. Poor urban areas are often the most overburdened by toxic 
pollution.38 
 
 Although characterization of the toxic burden and risks facing citizens living on 
the United States’ coasts remains incomplete, scientists and federal and state agencies 
have compiled enough data to suggest that coastal residents should be concerned. For 
example, between 1991 and 1997, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) analyzed 1543 surface sediment samples from 25 estuaries and marine bays—
i.e., the sediments closest to shore—from all three U.S. Coasts (Gulf, Atlantic, and 
Pacific), concluding that about 6 percent of the coast was toxic; the EPA’s parallel study 
calculated that 7 percent of the coast was toxic.39 However, tests based on sub-lethal 
effects on marine organisms suggested a much broader problem, with 26 to 39 percent of 
the U.S. coasts returning toxic results.40 
 
 Another indicator for concern comes from the EPA’s semi-regular National 
Coastal Condition Reports, which contain summaries of fish tissue contamination by 
region that provide another indicator of coastal toxic exposure. Specifically, the fish 
tissue assessment looks at the concentration of various toxics—arsenic, cadmium, 
mercury, selenium, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endosulfan, endrin, heptachlor epoxide, 
hexachlorobenzene, lindane, mirex, toxaphene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 
(PAHs), and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)—in fish and assesses coastal condition 
based on risks to human health through fish consumption.41 In the latest National Coastal 
Condition Report from 2012, 13 percent of U.S. coasts overall were in poor condition for 
fish tissue contamination, but regions ranged from zero percent in poor condition 
(southeastern Alaska and American Samoa) to 20 percent in poor condition along the 
northeast coast (although, notably, the calculations did not include the area of the Gulf 
of Mexico’s dead zone).42 Another 13 percent of U.S. coasts overall were in fair 
condition,43 indicating that, in total, over one-quarter of the nation’s coasts face some 
risk from toxicity. The EPA further noted that areas “in poor and fair condition were 
																																																						
38 Id. at 4. 
39 Edward R. Long, “Spatial Extent of Sediment Toxicity in U.S. Estuaries and Marine 
Bays,” in SHABEG S. SANDHU, BRIAN D. MELZIAN, EDWARD R. LONG, WALTER G. 
WHITFORD, & BARBARA T. WALTON, EDS., MONITORING ECOLOGICAL CONDITION IN THE 
WESTERN UNITED STATES 391, 391 (Kluwer Academic 2000). 
40 Id. 
41 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL COASTAL CONDITION REPORT IV, at 25 
(April 2012), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-
10/documents/0_nccr_4_report_508_bookmarks.pdf. 
42 Id. at ES-8, tbl. ES-2.  
43 Id. at 49. 
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dominated by samples with elevated concentrations of total PCBs, total DDT, total 
PAHs, and mercury.”44 
 
 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has compiled data from the EPA’s 
Superfund database for CERCLA and Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database for the 
federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),45 as well as 
several other sources of information from both the federal government and Canada,46 to 
create TOXMAP,47 a map of releases of specific toxic chemicals across the United States. 
Designed originally to facilitate emergency response,48 EPCRA requires all U.S. 
facilities releasing listed toxic and hazardous substances at or above reportable thresholds 
to report those releases,49 which are compiled onto the TRI database.50 TOXMAP makes 
clear that larger cities, whether coastal or not, generally endure the greatest 
concentrations of toxic releases. Nevertheless, as in the EPA’s “Cleanups in My 
Community” map, many coastal areas light up particularly noticeably on the NIH’s 
map—Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles on the Pacific; Houston, New Orleans, 
and Tampa on the Gulf; Milwaukee, Chicago, and Detroit along the Great Lakes; and 
almost all of Florida’s and the northeastern states’ Atlantic coasts. 
 
 Such compilations and characterizations of “standard” toxicity, however, do not 
paint the full picture of coastal toxic risk. Coastal storms and hurricanes can dramatically 
increase coastal communities’ acute and even longer-term toxic exposure. Moreover, 
toxic sites and infrastructure along the coast pose long-term concerns in the face of global 
sea-level rise. Hurricane Harvey provided a particularly graphic example of how storms 
can interact with coastal toxicity to pose significant human health concerns. 
 
B. Hurricane Harvey and Houston, August-September 2017 
 
 Hurricanes in the United States dramatically illuminate the latent toxicity of 
coastal zone infrastructure and reveal the fact that invading seawater threatens both 
unusually high emissions of hazardous air pollutants and a toxic soup of sewage, oil, and 
hazardous chemicals from coastal businesses (such as dry cleaners and auto repair 
																																																						
44 Id. 
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2012). 
46 National Institutes of Health, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, TOXMAP Fact 
Sheet, https://toxmap.nlm.nih.gov/toxmap/help/toxmapfs.html (as viewed July 31, 2018). 
47 National Institutes of Health, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, TOXMAP Home 
Page, https://toxmap.nlm.nih.gov/toxmap/app/ (as viewed July 31, 2018). 
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 11003-11005 (2012). 
49 Id. §§ 11002, 10023. 
50 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Toxic Release Inventory Program, 
https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program (as viewed July 31, 2018). 
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facilities), industrial sites, Superfund sites, and toxic waste facilities.51 While the full 
threat of dissolved and mixing toxic chemicals has not yet been fully realized as a result 
of a major U.S. coastal storm, some have come alarmingly close. For example, after 
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, “hazardous substances such as 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), lead, and arsenic were detected in the air, soil, and 
sediment samples,” and “the potential for a toxic release of hazardous substances after a 
storm exists.”52 Similarly, after Hurricane Sandy hit New York and New Jersey in 2012, 
officials “had to monitor 247 Superfund sites—one of which, the Gowanus Canal, 
overflowed into people’s homes.”53  
 
 1. Waste-Related Spills During Hurricane Harvey 
 
 Hurricane Harvey’s 2017 flooding of the Houston area—the United States’ 
fourth-largest city—may produce one of the most toxic legacies of U.S. hurricanes. To 
begin, Harvey inundated 13 of the Houston area’s 41 hazardous waste sites,54 and the 
																																																						
51 Danny D. Reible et al., Toxic and Contaminant Concerns Generated by Hurricane 
Katrina, 36:1 THE BRIDGE, Spring 2006, 
http://www.nae.edu/NAE/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/MKEZ-6MYQQP?OpenDocument; 
Kathryn Lane, Kizzy Charles-Guzman, KatherineWheeler, Zaynah Abid, Nathan Graber, 
& Thomas Matte, Health Effects of Coastal Storms and Flooding in Urban Areas: A 
Review and Vulnerability Assessment, 2013 J. ENVTL. & PUBLIC HEALTH, Article ID 
913064, at 2 (21 April 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/913064. 
52 Lane et al., supra note 51, at 5. See also Steven M. Presley, Thomas R. Rainwater, 
Galen P. Austin, Steven G. Platt, John C. Zak, George P. Cobb, Eric J. Marsland, Kang 
Tian, Baohong Zhang, Todd A. Anderson, Stephen B. Cox, Michael T. Abel, Blair D. 
Leftwich, Jennifer R. Huddleston, Randall M. Jeter, & Ronald J. Kendall, Assessment of 
Pathogens and Toxicants in New Orleans LA Following Hurricane Katrina, 40:2 ENVTL. 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 468, 468 (Dec. 14, 2005) (“Concentrations of aldrin, arsenic, 
lead, and seven semivolatile organic compounds in sediments/soils exceeded one or more 
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city contains “several other highly toxic sites managed by the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality.”55 (Notably, Hurricane Irma a few weeks later was even worse 
in terms of threatened superfund sites: 80 such sites stood in Hurricane Irma’s path 
through Florida.56) The New York Times described Harvey’s floodwaters as “a stew of 
toxic chemicals, sewage, debris and waste . . . . Runoff from the city’s sprawling 
petroleum and chemicals complex contains any number of hazardous compounds. Lead, 
arsenic and other toxic and carcinogenic elements may be leaching from some two dozen 
Superfund sites in the Houston area.”57  
 
 The worst of the inundated waste sites was the San Jacinto Waste Pits, a “dioxin-
laden federal Superfund site whose protective cap was damaged by the raging San Jacinto 
River.”58 “The San Jacinto Waste Pits are a heavily contaminated area near Houston that 
is right next to homes and schools, and that has frightened residents for decades.”59 The 
site consists of two waste pits in the middle of the San Jacinto river, where a paper mill 
dumped its wastes—especially dioxin and furans—during the 1960s.60 Paper companies 
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used dioxin to bleach paper white, and the compound is toxic at parts per quadrillion.61 
Temporary concrete caps installed in 2011 were supposed to keep the pits from further 
contaminating the river, but Hurricane Harvey caused the river to rip through them,62 
releasing contamination to the river.  
 
 However, smaller waste spills were also noteworthy. For example, W&P 
Development Corp., owns “an industrial park where about 100,000 gallons of oily 
wastewater were reported to have spilled into the San Jacinto from Aug. 29 to Aug. 31. 
The site was formerly Champion Paper Mill and a landfill there received wastes including 
turpentine- and lead-contaminated soil and mercury until 2008.”63  
 
 Wastewaters also proved problematic. “The largest spill, by far, was at 
ExxonMobil Corp.’s Olefins Plant in Baytown, east of the ship channel. Two days after 
Harvey hit, some 457 million gallons of stormwater mixed with untreated wastewater, 
including oil and grease, surged into an adjacent creek.”64 Floodwaters also became 
contaminated with sewage, and testing of floodwater samples revealed E. coli bacterial 
concentrations 10 to 80 times higher than the EPA’s recommendations for recreational 
water quality (the recommendation for drinking water is zero), although all the tests for 
heavy metals revealed concentrations below the EPA’s levels of concern.65 
 
 2. Petroleum-Related Spills in Houston During Hurricane Harvey 
 
 However, Houston has more sources of toxicity than just waste sites. “Some 500 
chemical plants, 10 refineries and more than 6,670 miles of intertwined oil, gas and 
chemical pipelines line the nation's largest energy corridor.”66 The city is, of course, 
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famous for its oil industry, including oil refineries. Needless to say, record flooding and 
oil refineries don’t mix well. For example, “storage tanks holding crude oil, gasoline and 
toxic contaminants failed when storm water from Harvey caused them to collapse, 
spilling at least 145,000 gallons of fuel and polluting the air.”  “High levels of the 
carcinogen benzene were detected in a Houston neighborhood close to a Valero Energy 
refinery, . . . heightening concerns over potentially hazardous leaks from oil and gas 
industry sites damaged by Hurricane Harvey.” “Preliminary air sampling in the 
Manchester district of Houston showed concentrations of up to 324 parts per billion of 
benzene”—a concentration “above the level at which federal safety officials recommend 
special breathing equipment for workers.” In late August, ExxonMobil acknowledged 
“that Hurricane Harvey damaged two of its refineries, causing the release of hazardous 
pollutants”—specifically, high emissions of volatile organic compounds and over 1 
million pounds of sulfur dioxide,67 both of which are regulated air pollutants under the 
Clean Air Act. Initial reports from Texas regulators indicate that because of Hurricane 
Harvey, “the region’s massive petrochemical industry released more than 2 million 
pounds of harmful pollutants into the air as of Aug. 29”—“‘roughly 40 percent of what 
the entire Houston released in 2016 . . . .’”68 As of October 2017, the EPA was still 
assessing three reported spills at US Oil Recovery, described by news outlets as “a former 
petroleum industry waste processing plant contaminated with a dangerous brew of 
cancer-causing chemicals.”69  
 
 Numerous other petroleum-related spills also occurred. Flooding in Panther 
Creek, for example, caused several releases, including a “460,000-gallon gasoline spill 
at a Magellan Midstream Partners tank farm and nearly 52,000 pounds of crude oil from 
a Seaway Crude Pipeline Inc. tank.”70 Residents of Galena Park, a mostly Latino 
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neighborhood, were subjected to more than one dozen releases within a two-mile radius 
as a result of Harvey, including a gasoline spill at the Magellan terminal initially reported 
at 42,000 gallons but eventually revealed to be ten times bigger.71 In addition, “[t]he spill 
ranked as Texas’ largest reported Harvey-related venting of air pollutants, at 1,143 
tons.”72 
 
 3. Chemical Spills in Houston During Hurricane Harvey 
 
 As noted, Houston is also home to, or near, 500 chemical plants, many of which 
were flooded.  As CBS News reported in March 2018, “Nearly half a billion gallons of 
industrial wastewater mixed with storm water surged out of just one chemical plant in 
Baytown, east of Houston on the upper shores of Galveston Bay. Benzene, vinyl chloride, 
butadiene and other known human carcinogens were among the dozens of tons of 
industrial toxins released into surrounding neighborhoods and waterways following 
Harvey's torrential rains.”73 
 
 Some of the chemical releases created acutely dangerous conditions. For 
example, on August 28, “an 18-inch pipeline leak at Williams Midstream Services Inc. 
unleashed a plume of [hydrogen chloride gas] near the intersection of two major 
highways in La Porte, southeast of Houston, where the San Jacinto River meets the 50-
mile ship channel. It’s the petrochemical corridor's main artery that empties into 
Galveston Bay.”74 The resulting toxic cloud of hydrochloric acid spread about one-
quarter mile through the industrial neighborhood, forcing people to remain inside lest the 
vaporized acid burn their skin and lungs or suffocate and kill them.75 At the Channel 
Biorefinery & Terminals, “some 80,000 gallons of methanol spilled from a tank rupture 
into Greens Bayou, which enters the ship channel just downstream of the Magellan 
terminal. Highly flammable and explosive, methanol can cause brain lesions and other 
disorders.”76 
 
 Many other notable chemical releases occurred in and around Houston during 
Harvey. Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s Deer Park complex on the ship channel’s south bank 
released more than 3000 pounds of benzene, and the company initially reported a 1000-
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pound release of phenol, “which can burn skin and be potentially fatal . . . .”77 The 
Chevron Phillips Chemical Company plant in Baytown released “about 34,000 pounds 
of sodium hydroxide, or lye, which can cause severe chemical burns, and unpermitted 
airborne emissions, including 28,000 pounds of benzene . . . .”78 
 
 One of the worst hit chemical plants during Hurricane Harvey was the Arkema 
chemical plant, about 20 miles northeast of Houston,79 which is considered one of the 
most hazardous plants in Texas.80 Harvey’s rains inundated the plant, causing it to lose 
power, which in turn led to a loss of refrigeration.81 Unfortunately, “The plant 
manufactures organic peroxides commonly used in everyday products like kitchen 
countertops, industrial paints, polystyrene cups and plates, and PVC piping. The 
materials must be kept very cool, otherwise there is ‘the potential for a chemical reaction 
leading to a fire and/or explosion within the site confines,’ Arkema said.”82 Arkema itself 
reported the sequence of events as follows: 
 
The plant made extensive preparations prior to Hurricane Harvey.  We have 
backup generators at the site solely for the purpose of being a redundant 
power supply for refrigeration necessary for the safe storage of products.  
We also brought in diesel powered refrigerated tank trailers and additional 
fuel as a further redundancy.  Employees safely shut down all operations on 
Friday, August 25, prior to the hurricane’s landfall.  We left a small “ride-
out” crew on site to address situations that could arise at the site during the 
storm to protect the safety and security of the community.  The site lost 
primary power early Sunday morning August 27.  The additional back-up 
generators subsequently were inundated by water and failed.  On Monday, 
August 28 temperature sensitive products were transferred into 8 diesel-
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powered refrigerated containers where they currently reside.  We evacuated 
the ride-out crew on Tuesday, August 29 for their safety.  As of August 30, 
most of the refrigeration units have failed due to flooding.  The site itself is 
now completely flooded and inaccessible except by boat.  In conjunction 
with the Department of Homeland Security and the State of Texas, Arkema 
has set up a command post in an off-site location near the plant.83   
 
“With the power out and cooling systems failing, volatile organic peroxides exploded 
multiple times over the course of a week, producing towering pillars of fire and thick 
plumes of black smoke.”84 In all, “[m]ore than 200 residents had to evacuate because of 
the chemical fumes and noxious smoke caused by [the fire], and 21 people sought 
medical attention.”85 In particular, “15 public safety officers were treated at a hospital 
after inhaling smoke from chemical fires that followed the explosions.”86 These 
“sickened first responders” later filed suit, “as have Harris and Liberty counties, which 
claim the company violated numerous environmental and safety regulations.”87 
 
 4. Houston’s Post-Harvey Toxic Exposure 
 
 Houston residents were aware of at least some of the toxic releases around them 
during Harvey itself: “From Aug. 24 to Sept. 3, callers made 96 reports of oil, chemical 
or sewage spills across southeast Texas.”88 As of March 2018, however, “reporters 
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catalogued more than 100 Harvey-related toxic releases — on land, in water and in the 
air. Most were never publicized, and in the case of two of the biggest ones, the extent or 
potential toxicity of the releases was initially understated.”89 Notably, many of the 
companies who owned the sites where spills occurred had violated environmental laws 
in their management of those sites in the past.90   
 
 Perhaps most novel were the air pollution problems that Harvey generated: “from 
Aug. 23 to Aug. 30, 46 facilities in 13 counties reported an estimated 4.6 million pounds 
of airborne emissions that exceeded state limits, an analysis by the Environmental 
Defense Fund, Air Alliance Houston and Public Citizen shows.”91 Air pollution issues 
continued after the storm as plants that had shut down for the storm released unusual 
amounts of pollutants in restarting. For example, “A giant plastics plant in Point Comfort, 
about 100 miles southwest of Houston, released about 1.3 million pounds of excess 
emissions, including toxic gases like benzene, when it restarted after the storm.”92 
 
 Clearly, acute toxic exposures occurred during and immediately after the 
hurricane. For example, in early September, Houston “a high benzene level of 324 parts 
per billion—more than three times the level at which federal worker safety guidelines 
recommend special breathing equipment.”93 Around the San Jacinto Waste Pits, 
“[p]reliminary data from the EPA indicated that in sediment samples taken around the 
site, dioxins levels spiked 2,300 times above acceptable levels.”94 
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 However, because investigations remain incomplete, the longer-term toxic legacy 
that Harvey gifted to Houston residents is less clear. “Texas regulators say they have 
investigated 89 incidents, but have yet to announce any enforcement actions.”95 
Nevertheless, government monitoring of residual toxicity in Houston has been limited 
compared to what occurred after previous hurricanes, such as Ike (2008) and Katrina 
(2005).96 Academic testing and studies, however, suggest that the storm essentially 
washed out the city’s topsoil, leaving relatively few sites with worrisome levels of 
petroleum-related toxins.97 Nevertheless, while residents were initially told that the 
releases posed no threat to human health, as of March 2018 the EPA continued to worry 
about local toxic “hotspots” and the risks that they pose.98 
 
C. The Long-Term Threat of Toxic Sea-Level Rise 
 
 While hurricanes likely Harvey dramatize coastal toxicity and its public health 
risks for coastal inhabitants, sea-level rise (and the increased storm surge that comes with 
it) present coastal planners with a far more insidious toxicity problem. 
 
 First, rising seas make coastal storm events worse; indeed, the exacerbation of 
storm surge is the most immediate and significant consequence of sea-level rise. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “it is likely that 
extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced in storm surges) have increased since 
1970, being mainly the result of mean sea level rise.”99  
 
 Second, in many parts of the United States—notably the Gulf Coast—sea-level 
rise will cause the ocean to progressively inundate and saturate existing toxic 
infrastructure, potentially condemning emerging coastal communities and ecosystems to 
a toxic existence. According to the IPCC, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 meters over 
the period 1901 to 2010, and “the rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has 
been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia.”100 The IPCC also 
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concluded that the mean rate of global average sea level rise for the period from 1993 to 
2010 was twice what occurred from 1901 to 2010.101  
 
 Sea level rise has two main components: melting land-based ice (glaciers and ice 
shelves) and expanding volume as the ocean warms.102 Although the two contributors 
have been roughly equal until recently, melting ice and disintegrating ice shelves have 
become significantly more important.103 Sea level rise will continue to accelerate through 
the 21st century and beyond, affecting a projected 95 percent of the ocean area and 
approximately 70 percent of coastlines worldwide.104 However, sea level rise will not be 
uniform across regions. For example, “[s]ince 1993, the regional rates for the Western 
Pacific are up to three times larger than the global mean, while those for much of the 
Eastern Pacific are near zero or negative.”105 
 
 The future of the planet’s ice presents a worrisome uncertainty, and the increasing 
pace of polar ice melt has added significant volatility to the art of sea level rise 
prediction.106 Studies repeatedly indicate that the Greenland ice sheet and Antarctic ice 
are melting faster than expected,107 and the IPCC noted in 2014 that the Greenland and 
Antarctic ice sheets were losing mass, likely at an increasing rate, and that glaciers around 
the world have continued to shrink.108 It projects that these ice sheets and glaciers will 
continue to decrease throughout the 21st century, shrinking 15% to 85% by 2100.109 The 
IPCC concluded that knowledge concerning “[a]brupt and irreversible ice loss from the 
Antarctic ice sheet…is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment” of its 
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likelihood.110 However, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet contains enough ice to raise sea 
level by five to seven meters (17-23 feet).111 If all of Antarctica melts, sea level will rise 
approximately 60 meters, or almost 200 feet.112 If both Greenland and Antarctica melt 
completely, sea level would rise about 65 meters,113 or approximately 215 feet.   
 
 Regardless of which of these ice-melt calamities occur, and when, sea-level rise 
will continue throughout the 21st century,114 although its exact impact will vary 
considerably among coastal regions. For example, the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program has noted that the southeastern region of the United States, which includes the 
Gulf Coast, is particularly at risk from sea-level rise, while the Northeast’s threats arise 
more from coastal flooding as a result of increased precipitation and coastal storms.115 In 
the Southeast, 
 
Global sea level rose about eight inches in the last century and is projected 
to rise another 1 to 4 feet in this century. Large numbers of southeastern 
cities, roads, railways, ports, airports, oil and gas facilities, and water 
supplies are vulnerable to the impacts of sea level rise. Major cities like 
New Orleans, with roughly half of its population below sea level, Miami, 
Tampa, Charleston, and Virginia Beach are among those most at risk. 
 
As a result of current sea level rise, the coastline of Puerto Rico around 
Rincòn is being eroded at a rate of 3.3 feet per year. Puerto Rico has one of 
the highest population densities in the world, with 56% of the population 
living in coastal municipalities.116 
 
As the Program is quick to point out, the economic consequences of sea-level rise in the 
Southeast could be considerable. As one example, “Louisiana State Highway 1, heavily 
used for delivering critical oil and gas resources from Port Fourchon, is sinking, at the 
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same time sea level is rising, resulting in more frequent and more severe flooding during 
high tides and storms. A 90-day shutdown of this road would cost the nation an estimated 
$7.8 billion.”117 It does not mention, however, the implications for toxic exposures. 
 
 Along the Pacific coast, in California, “Sea level has risen approximately 7 inches 
from 1900 to 2005, and is expected to rise at growing rates in this century.”118 “Flooding 
and erosion in coastal areas are already occurring even at existing sea levels and damaging 
some California coastal areas during storms and extreme high tides. Sea level rise is 
projected to increase as Earth continues to warm, resulting in major damage as wind-
driven waves ride upon higher seas and reach farther inland.”119 In the Pacific Northwest, 
“the effects of sea level rise, erosion, inundation, threats to infrastructure and habitat, and 
increasing ocean acidity collectively pose a major threat to the region.”120 The damage to 
critical coastal infrastructure could be considerable: 
 
The region’s populous coastal cities face rising sea levels, extreme high 
tides, and storm surges, which pose particular risks to highways, bridges, 
power plants, and sewage treatment plants. Climate-related challenges also 
increase risks to critical port cities, which handle half of the nation’s 
incoming shipping containers.121 
 
Most of this infrastructure, however, is also associated with coastal toxicity and 
hazardous materials. 
 
 Thus, even in government reports that acknowledge climate change and describe 
its projects impacts on U.S. coastal communities in detail, little attention is paid to the 
existing and potential risks from toxics in the coastal zone. Dealing with this toxic load, 
however, should be added to climate change adaptation efforts in this country. As part of 
that effort, the next Part reviews existing laws particularly relevant to reducing the toxic 
load along the nation’s coasts. 
 
 
III. EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELEVANT TO COASTAL TOXICITY 
 
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
 (CERCLA) 
																																																						
117 Id.; see also id. at 90 (discussing the potential for economic disruption in the nation’s 
coastal regions). 
118 Id. at 92. 
119 Id. at 78. 
120 Id. at 80. 
121 Id. at 78. 
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 As noted, Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to promote the cleanup of existing 
toxic sites; in that sense, CERCLA is best characterized as retrospective environmental 
law (i.e., providing for cleanup liability after a hazardous release has already occurred) 
than proactive or preventive. Nevertheless, CERCLA and its state analogs remain 
important legal vehicles for promoting the cleanup of existing toxic sites along the coast. 
 
 CERCLA is triggered by the release—past or present—of hazardous substances 
from a facility.122 Because CERCLA was one of the last major federal environmental 
statutes that Congress enacted, it defines “hazardous substances” by referencing earlier 
legislation—toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act, hazardous wastes under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air 
Act, and imminently hazardous chemicals under the Toxic Substance Control Act.123 
However, the EPA can also designate additional “hazardous substances” particularly for 
CERCLA.124 
 
 The EPA also designates “reportable quantities” of hazardous substances.125 In 
order to facilitate effective responses to new releases of hazardous substances, CERCLA 
requires “[a]ny person in charge of a vessel or an onshore or offshore facility” to 
immediately report releases of hazardous substances in excess of the relevant reportable 
quantities to the National Response Center as soon as that person knows of the release.126 
CERCLA defines “release” broadly to include “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, 
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing 
into the environment,” except for the many kinds of “releases” that are regulated under 
other statutes.127 Thus, pesticide applications regulated under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and pollutant discharges regulated under the 
Clean Water Act are exempt from CERCLA’s reporting requirement.128 Otherwise, 
failures to report releases of hazardous substances and false reports are subject to criminal 
penalties.129 
 
 Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the President of the United States—who has 
since delegated this authority to the EPA—to respond to releases of hazardous substances 
																																																						
122 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2012). 
123 See id. § 9601(14) (defining “hazardous substance” by cross-referencing these 
statutes). 
124 Id. §§ 9601(14)(B), 9602(a). 
125 Id. § 9602(a). 
126 Id. § 9603(a). 
127 Id. § 9601(22). 
128 Id. § 9603(e). 
129 Id. § 9603(b). 
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through removal and remedial actions.130 Removal actions are the government’s 
immediate response to a spill or release, designed primarily to contain the hazardous 
substances and limit the threat to the public.131 Remedial actions, in contrast, are “actions 
consistent with permanent remedy . . . .”132 Both such cleanup actions must be consistent 
with the National Contingency Plan,133 which establishes “procedures and standards for 
responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants . . . .”134 
 
 Alternatively, the EPA can order abatement actions under section 106 of 
CERCLA.135 As a practical matter, the primary difference between a section 104 cleanup 
and a section 106 cleanup is that under section 104, governments perform the cleanup 
and seek reimbursement, while under section 106, potentially responsible parties (PRPs) 
perform (and generally pay for) the cleanup themselves, subject to federal and/or state 
supervision.136 The EPA must notify the affected state before ordering a section 106 
abatement action137 and “shall promulgate regulations providing for substantial and 
meaning involvement by each State in initiation, development, and selection of remedial 
actions to be undertaken in that State.”138 The affected state also has a right to concur (or 
not) in the federal government’s selection of certain remedial actions and a right to 
intervene in or bring a relevant action if the state objects to the remedy that the federal 
government chooses.139 
 
 Section 107 is the heart of CERCLA’s liability scheme. First, section 107 
identifies four categories of PRPs: 
 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance 
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were 
disposed of, 
 
																																																						
130 Id. § 9604(a). 
131 See id. § 9601(23) (defining “remove” and “removal”). 
132 Id. § 9601(24).  
133 Id. § 9604(a). 
134 Id. § 9605(a). 
135 Id. § 9606(a). 
136 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161 (2004) (citing Key Tronic 
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994)). 
137 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2010). 
138 Id. § 9621(f). 
139 Id. § 9621(f)(2).  
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(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for 
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for 
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such 
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel 
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous 
substances, and 
 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substance for 
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened 
release which causes the incurrence of response costs . . . .140 
 
These PRPs become liable for four kinds of costs and damages: 
 
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States 
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national 
contingency plan [response costs]; 
 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with the national contingency plan; 
 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, 
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss 
resulting from such a release [natural resources damages]; and 
 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study [required 
under section 104].141 
 
Finally, Section 107 provides PRPs with only three defenses: (1) if the release and 
resulting damages were caused solely by “an act of God”; (2) if the release and resulting 
damages were caused solely by “an act of war”; or (3) if the release and resulting damages 
were caused solely by “an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or 
agent” of the PRP, and with no contractual relationship with the PRP, if the PRP 
exercised “due care” and “took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any 
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or 
																																																						
140 Id. § 9607(a). 
141 Id. 
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omissions . . . .”142 Otherwise, PRPs can pursue a variety of settlement options with the 
governments143 and contribution actions against each other.144 
 
 CERCLA’s basic goal is thus to have the people or companies who created a 
contaminated site pay to clean it up. However, Congress also created a Hazardous 
Substance Superfund, funded through a tax on chemical and oil companies, to pay for 
the cleanup of “orphan” sites.145 This tax “expired in 1995, and [it has] not been 
reinstated,146 with the result that Congress has been appropriating money to the 
Superfund through the normal federal budget process. 
 
 While CERCLA remains an important legal aspect of promoting coastal cleanups, 
contamination removal under its auspices has been notoriously slow in many 
circumstances, and nothing in the act requires governments to prioritize sites by location 
(say, in the coastal zone). The San Jacinto Waste Pits flooded during Hurricane Harvey 
provide an apt example. As noted, the site first became contaminated in the 1960s, and it 
has long been known for its toxicity. For example, “the Texas Parks and Wildlife 
Department warns people should not eat fish and crabs from the area because the animals 
may be contaminated,” and the EPA added the site to the CERCLA NPL in 2008.147 After 
Harvey, then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt put the San Jacinto Waste Pits on a list of 
special sites deserving of his personal attention, the EPA announced a $115 million plan 
to remove contaminated material from the site, and a court approved an agreement 
whereby two companies would come up with a plan to clean up the site.148 However, in 
April 2018, Pruitt removed the San Jacinto Waste Pits from his special list, leaving the 
																																																						
142 Id. § 9607(b). 
143 Id. § 9622 
144 Id. § 9613(f). 
145 Id. § 9611. 
146 Id. 
147 Rebecca Hersher, “EPA Takes Toxic Site Flooded by Harvey Off Special Cleanup 
List,” National Public Radio (NPR), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/04/16/601867839/epa-takes-toxic-site-flooded-by-harvey-off-special-
cleanup-list (April 16, 2018). 
148 Id. See also Michael D. Regan, “Health concerns swirl in Texas months after floods 
from Harvey spread toxic waste,” PBS NewsHour, 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/health-concerns-swirl-in-texas-months-after-
floods-from-harvey-spread-toxic-waste (Dec. 10, 2017) (reporting the same figures). 
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companies with 29 months—more than two years—to formulate their cleanup plan.149 
Cleanup at the site, even after Harvey, is expected to take more than four years.150 
 
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
 
 Congress enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA)151 in 1976, but after the 
1980 amendments it is much more commonly known the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA). Unlike CERCLA, RCRA is proactive, seeking to prevent new 
contamination for hazardous waste. Specifically, Congress found that “although land is 
too valuable a national resource to be needlessly polluted by discarded materials, most 
solid waste is disposed of on land in open dumps and sanitary landfills” and that “disposal 
of solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land without careful planning and 
management can present a danger to human health and the environment * * *.”152 
 
 RCRA applies to “solid waste,” which the statute defines as: 
 
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply 
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, 
including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting 
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from 
community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in 
domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows 
or industrial sources which are point sources subject to permits under 
section 1342 of Title 33 [the Clean Water Act], or source, special nuclear, 
or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended * * *.153 
 
From there, RCRA regulation depends on whether solid waste is hazardous or not. 
 
																																																						
149 Rebecca Hersher, “EPA Takes Toxic Site Flooded by Harvey Off Special Cleanup 
List,” National Public Radio (NPR), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/04/16/601867839/epa-takes-toxic-site-flooded-by-harvey-off-special-
cleanup-list (April 16, 2018). 
150 Michael D. Regan, “Health concerns swirl in Texas months after floods from Harvey 
spread toxic waste,” PBS NewsHour, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/health-
concerns-swirl-in-texas-months-after-floods-from-harvey-spread-toxic-waste (Dec. 10, 
2017) (reporting the same figures). 
151 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012). 
152 Id. § 6901(b)(1), (2). 
153 Id. § 6903(27). 
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 Nonhazardous solid waste is subject to RCRA Subtitle D. Under these provisions, 
states received the primary authority to regulate non-hazardous solid waste. First, they 
were expected to enact state solid waste management plans.154 In order to receive federal 
approval, these state plans had to meet six statutory requirements. Most importantly, 
states had to forbid new open dumps within their borders and provide for the closing or 
upgrading of all existing open dumps.155 As part of these controls, states were expected 
to implement permit programs for solid waste management facilities to control their 
intake of hazardous waste.156 In addition, new disposal could only occur at sanitary 
landfills.157 Under Congress’s requirements, all new, replacement, and expanded landfills 
had to be built with at least two liners and leachate collection systems and had to provide 
for groundwater monitoring.158  
 
 RCRA regulation, however, focuses far more stringently on hazardous waste, 
which is regulated under Subtitle C. A “hazardous waste” is “a solid waste, or 
combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, 
chemical, or infectious characteristics may—” 
 
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an 
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or 
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the 
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, 
or otherwise managed.159 
 
The EPA had the responsibility to “develop and promulgate criteria for identifying the 
characteristics of hazardous waste, and for listing hazardous waste” and to actually list 
hazardous wastes subject to RCRA’s subtitle C requirements, “taking into account 
toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and 
other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous 
characteristics.”160 It identified characteristics that made wastes hazardous—
																																																						
154 Id. § 6943. 
155 Id. § 6943(a)(2), (3). 
156 Id. § 6945(c)(1). 
157 Id. § 6944(b). 
158 Id. § 6924(o). 
159 Id. § 6903(5). 
160 Id. § 6921(a), (b)(1). 
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ignitability,161 corrosiveness,162 reactivity,163 and toxicity164—but also listed specific 
types of hazardous wastes from various types of industries and industrial processes.165 
 
 Subtitle C seeks to regulate hazardous wastes from “cradle to grave”—that is, 
from initial creation to eventual (safe) disposal. Hazardous waste generation is “the act 
or process of producing hazardous waste.”166 Hazardous waste generators must keep 
records that identifying the hazardous wastes that they generate; label those wastes 
properly; store the waste in appropriate containers; begin RCRA’s manifest system to 
track the waste; and provide information and reports about the waste.167 Hazardous waste 
transporters, in turn, must keep records about the waste they transport, continue the 
manifest system, refuse to transport improperly labeled hazardous waste, and deliver the 
waste only to permitted treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities.168 RCRA 
rigorously regulates these TSD facilities, requiring permitting, financial responsibility, 
contingency plans, recordkeeping, and strict compliance with storage, handling, and 
disposal requirements.169 In addition, as noted above, TSD facilities become liable for 
corrective actions—that is, for cleanups at and beyond the TSD facility if hazardous 
wastes escape.170  
 
 Several facilities located in and near Houston during Hurricane Harvey were 
regulated under Subtitle C. For example, the Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby, Texas, 
that caught fire was regulated as a RCRA large quantity hazardous waste generator under 
the Handler ID TXD043750512.171 Until 2011, the plant shipped all of its wastes off-site, 
but by 2013 it was generating over 16,000 tons of hazardous waste and handling most of 
that waste on-site.172 It produces a variety of hazardous wastes, including toxic metals 
(arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, selenium, and silver), toxic benzene, and 
toxic tetracholoroethylene, among several others.173 Nevertheless, until Harvey, the 
																																																						
161 40 C.F.R. § 261.21 (2017). 
162 Id. § 261.22. 
163 Id. § 261.23. 
164 Id. § 261.24. 
165 Id. §§ 261.31-261.33. 
166 42 U.S.C. § 6903(6) (2012). 
167 Id. § 6922(a). 
168 Id. § 6923(a). 
169 Id. § 6924(a). 
170 Id. § 6924(v). 
171 Information retrieved from the EPA’s RCRAInfo database on July 31, 2018, 
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/enviro/rcrainfoquery_3.facility_information?pgm_sys_id=TXD
043750512. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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chemical plant was relatively compliant with RCRA: The State of Texas had taken only 
two informal (letter-based) enforcement actions under RCRA against the plant, although 
the facility has not been inspected since October 2013.174 
 
C. Coastal Zone Management Act 
 
 The federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)175 essentially bribes coastal 
states with federal consistency requirements, money, and technical assistance into 
engaging in proactive coastal planning and management.176 Specifically, the Act 
encourages states to create Coastal Zone Management Programs that meet 16 detailed 
requirements,177 most of which are easily classified as land (and sometimes water) use 
planning178 or governmental organization, authority, and procedures.179 A few 
requirements are fairly specific; for example, coastal states must address energy facilities 
in the coastal zone (including their impacts),180 coastal erosion,181 and nonpoint source 
pollution.182  
 
 The delineated components of a Coastal Zone Management Program are certainly 
broad enough to allow a state to prioritize coastal toxicity.183 However, nothing in the 
Act explicitly mentions toxics, toxicity, or hazardous waste. 
 
 Like all coastal states except Alaska, Texas implements an approved Coastal 
Zone Management Program, which it first adopted in 1997.184 The state’s goals for its 
program center around Coastal Natural Resource Areas, or CNRAs. Those goals are: 
 
• To protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the diversity, quality, quantity, 
functions, and values of CNRAs; 
																																																						
174 Information retrieved from the EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online 
(ECHO) database on July 31, 2018, https://echo.epa.gov/detailed-facility-
report?fid=110000463258. 
175 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2012). 
176 See id. §§ 1455-1456. 
177 Id. § 1455(d). 
178 Id. § 1455(d)(2), (9), (11)(B), (12), (13). 
179 Id. § 1455(d)(3)-(7), (10), (14)-(16). 
180 Id. § 1455(d)(2)(H), (8). 
181 Id. § 1455(d)(2)(I). 
182 Id. §§ 1455(d)(16), 1455b. 
183 E.g., id. § 1456b(a)(2), (4)-(6). 
184 TEXAS COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, 2015-2016 BIENNIAL REPORT 1-2 (Dec. 
2016), available at http://www.glo.texas.gov/coast/coastal-
management/forms/files/CMP-Biennial-Report-2015-2016.pdf. 
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• To ensure sound management of all coastal resources by allowing for compatible 
economic development and multiple human uses of the coastal zone; 
• To minimize loss of human life and property due to the impairment and loss of 
protective features of CNRAs; 
• To ensure and enhance planned public access to and enjoyment of the coastal 
zone in a manner that is compatible with private property rights and other uses of 
the coastal zone; 
• To balance the benefits from economic development and multiple human uses of 
the coastal zone, the benefits from protecting, preserving, restoring, and 
enhancing CNRAs, the benefits from minimizing loss of human life and property, 
and the benefits from public access to and enjoyment of the coastal zone; 
• To coordinate agency and subdivision decision-making affecting CNRAs by 
establishing clear, objective policies for the management of CNRAs; 
• To make agency and subdivision decision-making affecting CNRAs efficient by 
identifying and addressing duplication and conflicts among local, state, and 
federal regulatory and other programs for the management of CNRAs; 
• To make agency and subdivision decision-making affecting CNRAs more 
effective by employing the most comprehensive, accurate, and reliable 
information and scientific data available and by developing, distributing for 
public comment, and maintaining a coordinated, publicly accessible geographic 
information system (GIS) of maps of the coastal zone and CNRAs at the earliest 
possible date; 
• To make coastal management processes visible, coherent, accessible, and 
accountable to the people of Texas by providing for public participation in the 
ongoing development and implementation of the CMP; and 
• To educate the public about the principal coastal problems of state concern and 
technology available for the protection and improved management of CNRAs.185 
 
In addition, however, Texas is pursuing a coastal resiliency program, with public 
meetings focused on “increasing economic and environmental vulnerabilities, resulting 
from population growth, increased storm intensity, and shoreline erosion” and on 
“planning for changing conditions and future storm hazards along the coast.”186 In 
addition, the Program “is developing the Master Plan, a long-term framework intended 
to mitigate damage from future coastal natural disasters and preserve and enhance the 
state’s coastal natural resources and assets.”187 Nevertheless, although coastal 
infrastructure is clearly part of these discussions and resiliency planning, none of the 
identified strategies—“	 1) restoring Texas’s beaches and dunes; 2) bay shoreline 
stabilization and estuarine wetland restoration (living shorelines); 3) stabilizing the 
																																																						
185 Id. at 3. 
186 Id. at 10. 
187 Id. 
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GIWW; 4) freshwater wetland and coastal uplands conservation; 5) delta and lagoon 
restoration; 6) oyster reef creation and restoration; 7) rookery island creation and 
restoration; and 8) plans, policies, and programs”188—acknowledge coastal toxicity as a 
possible problem.  
 
 Toxicity consciousness may emerge in some parts of Texas at a more local level. 
For example, using grants from the Coastal Zone Management Program, Galveston Bay 
engaged both in a contaminated seafood warning program to educate subsistence and 
recreational fishers, especially in low-income and Spanish-speaking immigrant 
communities, “about the risk of consuming seafood contaminated with toxic substances” 
and a program to educate boaters about their wastes—most recently, the illegality of 
sewage discharges but with additional issues slated for future years.189 These 
developments thus suggest that Galveston might be one of the Texas coastal 
municipalities that most open to dealing more proactively with coastal toxicity problems. 
 
D. State and Local Land Use Planning 
 
 Unlike environmental and natural resource regulation, land use planning is 
usually the particular province of municipalities, and this aspect of local law can be 
critical to dealing with climate change and its impacts. C40, “a network of the world’s 
megacities committed to addressing climate change,”190 has underscored the importance 
of land use planning as follows: 
 
Land use planning provides the strategic framework for the growth of a city, 
determining the physical uses of space that will influence how people live 
and move, for generations to come. Cities have significant authority over 
land use policies and regulations. . . . It is particularly important that cities 
have a good plan for how they will address growth, because as C40 research 
has shown, the planning decisions made today will have a major impact on 
the carbon emissions of tomorrow.191 
 
By this organization’s international count, “79% of cities have the power to set land use 
policies and regulations and 81% are responsible for carrying out the function of land use 
planning.”192 
 
																																																						
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 16, 18, 22, 26. 
190 C40 Cities, About C40, https://www.c40.org/about (as viewed July 31, 2018). 
191 C40 Cities, Land Use Planning: Network Overview, 
https://www.c40.org/networks/land-use-planning (as viewed July 31, 2018). 
192 Id. 
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 Land use planning is also relevant to latent and cumulative toxicity concerns. 
Indeed, “[l]and use data are increasingly understood as important indicators of potential 
environmental health risk in urban areas where micro-scale or neighborhood level hazard 
exposure data are not routinely collected.”193 In 2003, a National Academy of Public 
Administration panel reported to the EPA that municipalities could use land use more 
effectively to reduce residents’ cumulative toxic exposures. Most directly, “local 
planning and zoning authorities could be used to reduce adverse impacts where industrial 
and residential areas are located near each other.”194 Notably, however, the report also 
advocated greater coordination and interaction between states and local governments to 
best deploy land use planning tools. For example, it recommended that states take steps 
to ensure local government participation in environmental permitting decisions (such as 
RCRA permitting decisions made through delegated federal authority), because 
“[t]hrough active involvement, local governments can help ensure that proposed 
environmental permits contain the conditions necessary to protect public health and the 
environment at the community level.”195 The report saw great promise for such increased 
cooperation, concluding that “[i]f state and local officials make creative and aggressive 
use of existing legal authorities, it may be possible to resolve the environmental and 
public health concerns of community residents.”196 
 
 Houston is infamous, however, for its lack of land use planning: “The city of 
Houston proper is unique among large US cities in that it has no traditional use-based 
zoning (ala-Sim City: residential here, commercial there, etc.) . . . .”197 However, that 
																																																						
193 Jason Corburn, Urban land use, air toxics and public health: Assessing hazardous 
exposures at the neighborhood scale, 27:2 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 145, 145 
(March 2007), available at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0195925506001260. 
194 PHILIP RUTLEDGE, A. JAMES BARNES, TEODORO BENAVIDES, JONATHAN HOWES, 
DAVID MORA, JAMES MURLEY, & SYLVESTER MURRAY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION, ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
RELATES TO LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING 18 (July 2003), available at 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/napa-land-use-zoning-
63003.pdf. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 19. 
197 Daniel Herriges, “Houston Isn’t Flooded Because of Its Land Use Planning,” Strong 
Towns, https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2017/8/30/houston-hurricane-harvey-land-
use (Aug. 30, 2017). See also Nolan Gray, “How Houston Regulates Land Use,” Market 
Urbanism, https://marketurbanism.com/2016/09/19/how-houston-regulates-land-use/ 
(Sept. 19, 2016) (“Unlike every other major U.S. city, Houston doesn’t mandate the 
separation of residential, commercial, and industrial developments. This means that 
restaurants, homes, warehouses, and offices are free to mix as the market allows. As many 
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doesn’t mean that development is completely haphazard. The city itself “regulates land 
use in many other ways, such as minimum-parking requirements. Many neighborhoods 
have homeowners associations and deed restrictions that limit what can be built. And 
Houston’s suburbs largely do have zoning.”198 
 
 Notably, in the immediate wake of Harvey, both local and national pundits 
debated the contribution of Houston’s land use planning to the severity of the flooding, 
particularly in terms of wetlands destruction and building in floodplains.199 Less 
flamboyant were several pre-Harvey examinations of the relationship be Houston area’s 
land use planning and residents’ potential toxic exposure. For example, Houston passed 
a hazardous materials ordinance in 1996 that prevents hazardous facilities from locating 
in neighborhoods that are more than one-third residential.200 However, like most such 
laws, this ordinance did not apply to hazardous facilities already in existence, effectively 
allowing those existing facilities to continue.201 
 
 A team of economists from the University of Pittsburgh and University of 
Washington, Bothell, happened to be assessing the long-term effect of zoning in Chicago 
across Hurricane Harvey’s timeframe, drafting their results in 2016 but publishing in 
May 2018.202 Because of Houston’s resistance to traditional zoning, it served as the 
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researchers’ control/counterfactual.203 Provocatively, 65 percent of Houston lies within 
one mile of a TRI reporting facility, compared to 30 percent of Austin, 44 percent of 
Dallas, and 43 percent of San Antonio, “suggest[ing] that land use patterns in relatively 
un-regulated Houston differ measurably from comparable cities that experienced formal 
zoning.”204 In addition, the researchers’ results for Chicago “strongly suggest that over 
the long-run urban planning has been eﬀective in creating residential neighborhoods that 
are distant from undesirable manufacturing uses, and that houses in these neighborhoods 
are more valuable as a result,”205 a result the economists clearly view as desirable. 
 
 However, it should be noted that there is another way of looking at the 
researchers’ results, which is that Houston’s approach to land use has more fairly spread 
the city’s overall toxic burden across its citizens. Notably, the researchers found that 
areas zoned for manufacturing or commercial use in Chicago were statistically more like 
to contain TRI reporting facilities206—a result that makes inherent intuitive sense. Such 
concentration of toxics-emitting facilities, however, is also a primary source of 
environmental justice concerns, as those who cannot afford the more expensive 
neighborhoods are forced by economics to live with additional toxic exposure and risk. 
 
 Regardless of how land use planning distributes toxic exposures, however, such 
exposures remain public health risks. For better for all concerned to reduce the city’s 
overall toxic burden in the first place. Houston’s 1996 hazardous facility ordinance was 
more akin to Chicago’s separation-of-uses approach to land use planning that to a real 
effort to reduce overall toxicity, but Part IV will discuss alternative approaches that better 
implement a toxicity reduction goal. 
 
E. Tort Law 
 
 Tort is the traditional remedy for preventable damage, and four torts in particular 
are generally associated with releases of toxic materials. Strict liability arises when a 
defendant engages in inherently dangerous activities or abnormally dangerous 
conduct.207 Unlike strict liability, negligence is a fault-based approach to liability that 
requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant violated a duty or standard of care, 
factually and legally causing the plaintiff harm.208 Trespass applies to a defendant’s 
physical invasion of the plaintiff’s real property, such as a physical spilling of toxic 
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materials onto the plaintiff’s property.209 Finally, nuisance allows a plaintiff to recover 
when a defendant unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of real 
property.210 “Public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with rights held by the 
public in general,” while private nuisance “is an unreasonable interference with the rights 
of a plaintiff who has a possessory interest in the land affected.”211 Like CERCLA, 
however, tort liability is retrospective and reactive: the damage, in almost all cases, has 
already occurred. 
 
 Hurricane Harvey gave rise to several follow-on lawsuits, many demonstrating 
how injured plaintiffs can attempt to use tort liability to seek compensation for their 
exposures to coastal toxicity. The Arkema Chemical Plant in Crosby has become a 
particularly cogent defendant as a result of the fires and other toxic releases at the plant. 
In early September 2017, even as Harvey was still winding down, “[s]even police, fire 
and emergency medical technicians sued Arkema in Harris County District Court for at 
least $1 million, alleging negligence by the company and executives led flammable 
organic peroxides stored at the site to ignite after the plant lost power during the 
storm.”212 Their complaint, filed in the Harris County District Court,213 alleges that the 
plaintiffs suffered vomiting and loss of breath while responding to the Arkema fires and 
asserts causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per se.214 
 
 The next month, residents of Crosby, Texas, filed a class action lawsuit in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, against 
Arkema,215 alleging negligence, trespass, nuisance, property damage, personal injury, 
failure to warn, product liability, ultra-hazardous activity (strict liability), gross 
negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.216 They seek punitive damages 
and are asking the court to pierce Arkema’s corporate veil so that its parent corporations 
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may also be held liable.217 The plaintiffs base their complaints both on the fires at the 
plant and on releases from two water tanks. They allege that “an estimated 23,608 pounds 
of contaminants were released from two [water] tanks including: ethylbenzene,mineral 
spirits, naptha, naphthalene, organic peroxides, trimethylbenzene, tert-butyl alcohol, 2,5 
dimethyl-2,5 di(t-butylperoxy)hexane and t-amyl alcohol.”218 In addition, according to 
the plaintiffs, the smoke and ash from the fire released PAHs, toxic metals like antimony, 
volatile organic compounds like acetone, dioxins, furans, and a host of other toxic 
compounds.219 
 
 What is striking in both cases is not just the plaintiffs’ assertions of past injuries 
during the hurricane and its toxic releases, but their fears for unknown future injuries. 
Thus, the plaintiff first responders seek not only actual damages for pain already suffered 
and medical care already received, but also “[r]easonable and necessary medical care and 
expenses which will in all reasonable probability be incurred in the future;” “[p]hysical 
pain and suffering in the future;” “[p]hysical impairment which, in all reasonable 
probability, will be suffered in the future;” “[l]oss of earning capacity which will, in all 
probability, be incurred in the future;” “[d]isfigurement in the future;” “[m]ental anguish 
in the future;” and “[t]he cost of future medical monitoring.”220 The Crosby residents, 
similarly, seek “[a]n Order establishing a Medical Monitoring Program designed to 
survey as appropriate and to protect the Class Members from latent, dread disease, funded 
by the Defendants . . . .”221 These cases, therefore, frame the Arkema flooding, fire, and 
releases as the source of true toxic torts, plunging the plaintiffs legally into the uncertain 
world of “futures” cases.222 
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 Studies released in May 2018 suggest that the plaintiffs in these cases may have 
good grounds for their lawsuits.223 The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board found that officials at the Arkema chemical plant had been warned over one year 
before Harvey that that plant was at risk of flooding, and it concluded in its 154-page 
report that Arkema “was not prepared for the 6 feet of water that wiped out the facility’s 
power and backup generators.”224 However, as the claims for medical monitoring and 
future damages show, the latent toxicity around Houston has morphed, because of 
Hurricane Harvey, into psychologically real and legally cognizable worries for all of the 
Arkema-exposed plaintiffs about their future health, with the true future risks that they 
face from their exposures during Harvey very unclear. 
 
 
IV. THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING A PRECAUTIONARY, HUMAN HEALTH-
BASED APPROACH TO IMPROVING COASTAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN THE 
ANTHROPOCENE 
 
 It can almost always be said, in almost any context, that governments could 
improve both their enforcement of environmental and public health laws and their 
disaster preparedness and response. Analyses of Hurricane Harvey in Houston certainly 
support these common suggestions for improving coastal responses to hurricanes.225 
Nevertheless, environmental enforcement and disaster response are largely reactionary, 
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rather than precautionary, responses to toxic coasts, effectively focused less on protecting 
public health than on supporting coastal industry until such industry causes real 
problems. 
 
 Coastal states and municipalities can pursue more precautionary, health-based 
management policies regarding toxics in the coastal zone. Federal law almost always 
leaves states free to pursue more stringent pollution policies than it requires, and new 
technologies can help these governments to de-toxify their coastal zones. This Part 
presents three truly precautionary suggestions that serve to promote coastal public health 
by reducing the ability of coastal storms and sea-level rise to produce toxic hazards 
during flooding and inundation.  
 
A. Clean Up Existing Contaminated Sites 
 
 While, as Part III discussed, legal authorities exist at both the federal and state 
levels to clean up existing toxic waste dumps and other hazardous sites, such cleanups 
have not proceeded as fast as they might, nor has coastal contamination been made a 
priority. As a result, “[c]ontaminated sites often go for years and sometimes decades 
without being fully cleaned up.”226  
 
 Finding sufficient money for these often-expensive cleanups is often part of the 
problem. As noted, the Superfund tax expired in 1995, and Congress has been funding 
CERCLA cleanups through annual appropriations. In 2015, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that both the funding and the effectiveness of 
CERCLA were declining, sometimes dramatically.227 Its more specific findings are 
worth quoting at length: 
 
Annual federal appropriations to the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) Superfund program generally declined from about $2 billion to about 
$1.1 billion in constant 2013 dollars from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. 
EPA expenditures—from these federal appropriations—of site-specific 
cleanup funds on remedial cleanup activities at nonfederal National 
Priorities List (NPL) sites declined from about $0.7 billion to about $0.4 
billion during the same time period. . . . EPA spent the largest amount of 
cleanup funds in Region 2 [comprising New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, 
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the U.S. Virgin Islands, and eight tribal nations228], which accounted for 
about 32 percent of cleanup funds spent at nonfederal NPL sites during this 
15-year period. The majority of cleanup funds was spent in seven states, 
with the most funds spent in New Jersey—over $2.0 billion in constant 2013 
dollars, or more than 25 percent of cleanup funds. 
 
From fiscal years 1999 through 2013, the total number of nonfederal sites 
on the NPL annually remained relatively constant, while the number of 
remedial action project completions and construction completions generally 
declined. . . . The total number of nonfederal sites on the NPL increased 
from 1,054 in fiscal year 1999 to 1,158 in fiscal year 2013, and averaged 
about 1,100 annually. The number of remedial action project completions 
at nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 37 percent during the 
15-year period. Similarly, the number of construction completions at 
nonfederal NPL sites generally declined by about 84 percent during the 
same period.229 
 
 Perhaps surprisingly to many, despite President Trump’s February 2018 overall 
proposal to slash the EPA’s budget, he proposed to maintain CERCLA cleanup funding 
at $1.1 billion for fiscal year 2019 and has proposed other mechanisms for funding 
cleanups as part of his infrastructure package.230 Some of these proposals, like giving 
CERCLA cleanups “access to financing under the Water Infrastructure Finance and 
Innovation Act (WIFIA) lending program to address contamination to water resources,” 
might simply shift existing money from other environmental issues to cleanups, both 
others would expand the grant money available to cleanup both brownfields and NPL 
sites.231 
 
 In March 2018, Congress did appropriate almost $1.1 billion to the Superfund, 
although that money can also be transferred to other federal agencies.232 It also directly 
provided $80 million in state and tribal assistance grants under CERCLA,233 over $77 
million to the National Institutes of Health for CERCLA-required health studies,234 and 
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over $74 million to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry for health risk 
assessments under CERCLA.235 In addition, under the heading of “Infrastructure,” 
Congress added another $63 million for the EPA’s CERCLA activities, $650 million for 
the state and tribal grants program, and $53 million to the EPA’s Water Infrastructure 
Finance and Innovation Program Account for loans.236 Finally, Congress also enacted 
through the budget bill the Brownfields Utilization, Investment, and Local Development 
(BUILD) Act of 2018, which, inter alia, increases the availability of grants and loans for 
brownfield sites—but not those on the NPL.237 
 
 However, this is not enough money. Thus, there continue to be calls to reinstate 
the Superfund tax,238 and there are also calls to increase the EPA’s CERCLA enforcement 
financing, providing the agency the ability to force the liable parties to pay for 
cleanups.239  
 
 Direct citizen actions offer an alternative approach. The ultimate “fix” to coastal 
cleanups is altered public priorities that can put sufficient pressure on politicians at all 
levels of government to provide the funding and personnel necessary to expedite de-
toxifying actions. In the meantime, citizen lawsuits can sometimes provide a second-best 
jump-start. Unlike most federal environmental laws, however, CERCLA’s citizen suit 
provision240 is of limited use to plaintiffs who are not themselves liable under the Act to 
try to force actual cleanups, because many of the damages that plaintiffs would seek are 
not “response costs” recoverable under CERCLA,241 because individuals, NGOs, and 
cities cannot seek natural resources damages,242 and because CERCLA includes a fairly 
stringent bar to any citizen suit that challenges an ongoing cleanup, including suits 
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seeking to strengthen that effort.243 RCRA’s citizen suit provision, however, can often 
(but not always) fill in, because it allows plaintiffs to bring suit “against any person who 
has contributed or is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment . . . .”244 While 
litigation also requires money, RCRA allows courts to award costs and attorney fees to 
successful plaintiffs,245 and, like most federal environmental citizen suit provisions, it 
preserves plaintiffs’ tort remedies.246 
 
 However, cities can also act to effectuate coastal cleanups. As one example, the 
City of Emeryville, California, located between Berkeley and Oakland on San Francisco 
Bay, was essentially one large brownfield site.247 Specifically, “As large industries began 
to contract and relocate to other cities in the 1970s, they left behind properties with toxins 
that had to be cleaned up before other businesses could use them.”248 To address these 
sites, the City assembled state and federal grants both to clean up properties that it owns 
and to make loans to private property owners for private remediation.249 One of the city’s 
current projects will become a greenway; another will be turned into affordable 
housing.250 
 
B. Implement Toxic-Aware Land Use and Waste Management Planning Along 
the Coast 
 
 While cleaning up legacy toxicity remains a significant political challenge, 
coastal municipalities and states can take a number of other measures to reduce the toxic 
load on the nation’s coasts moving forward. One avenue is to revamp land use planning 
to more directly address toxicity issues. The National Academy of Public Administration 
panel, for example, made several recommendations relevant to municipalities seeking to 
avoid concentrations of toxic and hazardous facilities in particular areas. First, such 
municipalities should “take steps to eliminate existing nonconforming uses that present 
public health and environmental hazards.”251 Second, they should adopt more flexible 
zoning techniques, such as:” 
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• Setting up conditional uses that impose restrictions on certain uses that 
may affect environmental justice issues; 
• Establishing overlay zones that impose additional requirements to provide 
for additional environmental protections; 
• Using performance zoning to regulate the adverse impacts of nuisance-
like activities, such as noise and odor; and 
• Establishing buffer zones in transitional areas between incompatible land 
uses, especially for industrial uses adjacent to residential areas.252 
 
Overall, the panel concluded, “[l]ocal governments can play a primary role in identifying 
neighborhoods where residents face multiple environmental and public health risks. 
However, they need help from the other levels of government to develop and implement 
strategies for reducing risks, taking advantage of each level’s unique authorities and 
expertise.”253 
 
 The Toxics Action Center has also recommended toxicity-reducing actions that 
states and municipalities can take. First, states and municipalities can act to reduce or 
eliminate persistent toxic chemicals in the coastal zone.254 Persistent toxic chemicals are 
slow to break down and lose their toxicity, and “[t]hese contaminants can cause cancer, 
birth defects and other reproductive problems, immune system challenges and damage to 
the nervous and respiratory systems.”255 Massachusetts, for example, “passed the Toxics 
Use Reduction Act (TURA), creating a highly successful system to assist industrial users 
of large quantities of toxic chemicals to reduce their toxics use. This program has been 
good for public health and also resulted in significant cost savings for many participating 
businesses.”256 Indeed, reports indicate that between 1990 and 1999, businesses in 
Massachusetts reduced their chemical wastes by 57 percent, reduced their use of toxic 
chemicals by 40 percent, reduced their chemical emissions by 80 percent—and save $15 
million in the process.257 Other examples of such state statutes exist, including Oregon’s 
1989 Toxics Use and Hazardous Waste Reduction Act,258 which requires any large toxics 
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user in the state to complete a toxics use reduction and hazardous waste reduction plan 
that identifies alternatives to its current practices.259 
 
 Second, relatedly, states and municipalities can work to reduce specific uses of 
toxic materials, and hence residents’ direct exposures. For example, in 2001 
Massachusetts enacted the Children and Families Protection Act260 “to reduce children’s 
exposure to harmful pesticides by restricting pesticide use in private and public schools 
and daycare centers and increasing right-to-know. Unfortunately, the law has been 
implemented unevenly across the state.”261  
 
 Third, coastal municipalities can work to reduce their overall waste streams, 
working toward a goal of zero waste. For example, Nantucket, Massachusetts, “diverts 
more than 92% of waste from landfills through aggressive recycling and waste reduction 
practices and has extended the life of the landfill for decades.”262 
 
C. Enact Building Codes that Minimize the Potential for Further Toxic 
Releases 
 
 Many industrial facilities in Houston essentially threw up their hands in trying to 
prevent releases during Hurricane Harvey. The on-site manager of Gulf Coast Energy, 
for example, declared his facility’s release of methanol “‘impossible to contain’” in light 
of the 20-foot floodwaters.263 Similarly, Arkema Chemicals resists arguments that it 
failed to prepare its Crosby, Texas, chemical plant adequately, emphasizing that the 
flooding during Harvey was “unprecedented.”264 
 
 While lawyers, politicians, scientists, economists, and public health officials can 
(and do) debate how much preparation is “too much” in light of increasing risks to coastal 
communities from climate change, coastal storms, sea-level rise, and storm surge, it is 
worth noting that architects and building engineers having been putting considerable 
effort into designing “storm-proof” homes and businesses that could greatly reduce toxic 
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contamination from flooding. These efforts range from developing better building 
materials, such as bendable glass and ultra-high performance concrete,265 to architectural 
designs intended to deflect wave and wind energy rather than merely withstand them.266 
Some of these are futuristic and rounded; others—like many of those designed for Brad 
Pitt’s Make It Right Foundation to benefit victims of Hurricane Katrina—simply modify 
traditional building shapes and incorporate better materials.267 
 
 How exactly buildings are constructed is often dictated by building codes. Indeed, 
as one commentator noted, building codes have already been important in reducing 
hurricane destruction: 
 
Building codes are the baseline defense against hurricane damage. 
Improved building codes in Florida (the most stringent in the nation) after 
1992’s Hurricane Andrew required installing impact windows, using 
stronger ties between roofs and walls, and securing roof shingles with nails 
instead of staples, according to the Wall Street Journal. And indeed, newer 
buildings built to code fared better during Hurricane Irma.268 
 
Coastal states and municipalities should consider the new hurricane-proof designs when 
updating coastal building codes. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Public health considerations are an important part of climate change adaptation 
strategies. As the U.S. Global Change Research Program recognized in 2014, “Public 
health actions, especially preparedness and prevention, can do much to protect people 
from some of the impacts of climate change. Early action provides the largest health 
benefits. As threats increase, our ability to adapt to future changes may be limited.”269  
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 Coastal adaptation is a complex subject, but discussions about retreat, armoring, 
and coastal water supplies often ignore or sideline the ever-present issue of coastal 
toxicity. Coastal storms like Hurricane Harvey, however, make this toxic potential 
obvious, underscoring its status as both a continuing present threat to public health and a 
future burden on changing coastlines, migrating coastal communities, and evolving 
coastal ecosystems. Therefore, a precautionary and health-based approach to coastal 
climate change adaptation—at all of the federal, state, and local levels—should explicitly 
and directly address the reduction of coastal toxicity, better employing environmental 
law, land use planning, toxicity prevention statutes and ordinances, and even building 
codes to achieve this goal. 
